Army continues to try to distort GAO and other reports

Recently, in a response to a question by Senator Udall and during his confirmation hearing, Army Secretary Nominee John McHugh reintroduced the possibility that eminent domain might ultimately be used to expand Pinon Canyon. His response to Mr. Udall's question about his commitment to work only with willing sellers was that he wouldn't make such a promise since he wasn't sure he could keep it, but that working with willing sellers should be the preferred "first path." (Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, July 30, 2009)

On July 24^th we participated in a forum hosted by Action-22 at the Colorado State University campus in Pueblo. Also participating, representing the Army was Operations Officer, Mr. James Rice, (Col. Retired.) At that forum Mr. Rice misrepresented the GAO reports, stating that the reports “validated the Army’s expansion plan.” As you know, both reports very clearly state that they do no such thing. GAO-09-171, states that the report "focused on the extent to which the Army addressed the report provisions required by the section 2831 of the National Defense Authorization Act" and "not the extent to which we do or do not concur with the Army's plan." (GAO-09-171, page 20.) GAO-09-32 reviews the Army's approach to land acquisition; not whether their proposed Pinon Canyon expansion is a good idea. The report clearly states, "We did not assess the soundness or validity of the Army's proposed or completed land acquisition.” (GAO-09-32, page 36 )

We are concerned that Army is attempting to distort the GAO’s conclusions.

The GAO reports point out that the Army failed to answer several important questions that they were required to respond to by Congress and that the process by which they pursued their expansion proposal was flawed. We find in these reports ample support for our contention that Fort Carson's application for a waiver from the Department of Defense moratorium on major land acquisitions was flawed and actions taken by the Army subsequent to the approval of that waiver have deviated from its expressed purpose in significant ways and that the waiver should therefore be terminated. The Army should have that approval withdrawn and revert to its prior status under the conditions of the DoD moratorium on major land acquisitions.

GAO-09-171 indicates that the Army failed to respond to six of the Congressional mandates and that they failed to provide any rationale for selecting the 100,000 acres for the proposed expansion. This is a significant deviation from the original application for waiver and another factor that should nullify it.

GAO-09-171 also indicates that the per acre cost of the land in the Army's revised initiative to acquire 100,000 acres, has been doubled from the per acre cost indicated in the original proposal. These new factors invalidate the Department of Defense decision to approve the Army's waiver application.

GAO-09-32 recommends that the army develop and implement a process to update its plan for training ranges to reflect current needs. It points out that the Army's application for a waiver was done on the basis of an outdated Army Ranges and Training Lands Strategy. Again, this fact should invalidate the Army's waiver.

GAO-09-32 indicates that the Department of Defense and the Army failed in communicating with citizenry in their attempts at securing this major land acquisition. It makes the point that such public engagement should have occurred prior to their submission of an application for a waiver from the Department of Defense moratorium on major land acquisitions. The Army’s application for waiver, U.S. Department of the Army Major Land Acquisition Proposal, Section 7 - Public and Political Sensitivity, included the misleading statement that, "the military enjoys a positive relationship in the Colorado Springs area and southern Colorado." This statement failed to accurately represent to the Department of Defense the actual level of opposition that was present in the region at the time the application was submitted and that has intensified since. A more realistic approach would have been to include an accurate description of the depth of opposition expressed by political jurisdictions and community groups.

GAO-09-32 indicates that, in contrast with acquisitions in Hawaii and California, there was no pre-application communication process engaging stakeholders and local elected official in the Pinon Canyon region. Numerous resolutions had been passed in opposition to the Army's expansion proposal prior to the time that the application for waiver was submitted, but the application failed to indicate this fact to the Department of Defense. A more accurate analysis of "public and political sensitivity" would have enabled the Department of Defense to make a more informed decision. The absence of this important information in the original application should invalidate it.

It is also very important to note that it would not be appropriate for the Army to be allowed to address the unanswered questions identified by the GAO in the context of the NEPA process. The Army should not be rewarded for its failures by being given a green light to move forward with a Pinon Canyon Expansion EIS.

What should be done:

A comprehensive, top-down Department of Defense inventory of all Department of Defense testing and training ranges should be completed in compliance with Section 366 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act, 2003 which required that the Secretary of Defense to develop and maintain an inventory that identifies all available operational training ranges, all training range capacities. The Army’s methodology is based upon a base-by-base determination of training land shortfalls and fails to take into account surplus lands within the DoD real estate inventory. This methodology encourages competition between bases and communities for the federal money goes with the expansion of a base. In the case of PCMS the money goes to one community while the nationalization of private land and businesses falls on a different community. Troop positioning should be driven by available training land; not by the distribution of federal funds to local economies.

Another important point is implicitly made within the GAO reports; that the 100,000 acres identified as “Area A” is only the first phase of a larger acquisition plan.

Former Assistant Secretary of the Army, Installations and Environment, Mr. Keith Eastin belittled our concern about a larger, 17-year, multi-phased acquisition plan, characterizing it as a baseless rumor that we have “created in our minds.” But the GAO, having reviewed the same Army documents which gave rise to our concerns, recognizes that Area A is just the beginning. GAO-09-171 says, “the Army stated that from the outset it has placed a priority on the acquisition of area A, the 100,000 acres proposed in the initial expansion. While we are aware that the Army preferred the 100,000 acres initially our recommendation was focused on the usability and sustainability of the 100,000-acre parcel and not why the Army chose to start with the 100,000 acres.”(GAO-09-171, page 22.)

The Analysis of Alternatives, May 6, 2004, and The Pinon Vision (part one), OPLAN05-18, 2006 are two of the documents which prompted the GAO and PCEOC to conclude that “Area A” is only the “initial” “first” phase of the Army’s acquisition plan. These and other documents are also accessible on our website .

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